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A B S T R A C T
In contemporary healthcare policies the logic of Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) is typically proposed as a way
of addressing a demand to explicitly justify policy decisions. Policymakers' use of ‘evidence’ is presumed to
pertain to ideals of justice in decision-making. However, according to some, EBM is liable to generate ‘epistemic
injustice’ because it prefers quantitative types of evidence and – as a result of that – potentially undervalues the
qualitative testimonies of doctors and patients. Miranda Fricker's concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ refers to a
wrong done to a person in their capacity as a knower. This paper explores the usefulness and limits of this
concept in the context of public decision-making. How is evidence-based policymaking intertwined with ques-
tions of ‘epistemic injustice’? Drawing from ethnographic research conducted at the National Health Care
Institute, we analyze two cases of EBM-inspired policy practices in Dutch social health insurance: 1) the use of
the principles of EBM in making a public reimbursement decision, and 2) private insurers' use of quantitative
performance indicators for the practice of selective contracting on the Dutch healthcare market. While the
concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ misses some key processes involved in understanding how ‘knowing gets done’ in
public policy, it does shed new light on priority-setting processes. Patients or medical professionals who are not
duly recognized as credible and intelligible epistemic agents, subsequently, lack the social power to influence
priority-setting practices. They are thus not merely frustrated in their capacity to be heard and make themselves
understood, they are potentially deprived of a fair share in collective financial and medical resources. If we fail
to recognize inequalities in credibility and intelligibility between diverse groups of knowers, there is a chance
that these epistemic inequalities are being reproduced in our system of health insurance and our ways of dis-
tributing healthcare provisions.
1. Introduction
Policy decisions regarding the organization of accessibility, effi-
ciency and quality of care need to be explicitly justified in the public
arena, particularly in these times of soaring health care expenses and
limited budgetary resources. In liberal democracies policymakers
working in the field of health care often justify such thorny decisions on
the basis of scientific and technical knowledge, e.g. techniques of health
economics and the principles of Evidence-based Medicine (EBM). The
use of this type of technical knowledge pertains to ideals of impartiality
and justice in making policy decisions (cf. Porter, 1994; Porter, 1995).
Yet, while policymakers turn to ‘evidence’ as a strategy to explicitly
justify complex decisions, these decisions are ever more contested in the
public domain (Bijker et al., 2009; Horstman, 2014; Syrett, 2003,
2007), for example by disappointed patients who feel that their ex-
periences and preferences are being ignored in public policies. It seems
that while the use of evidence has become an expectation against which
the integrity and justice of policy decisions is assessed, at the same time,
the question of what counts as ‘evidence’ and whose knowledge counts
as relevant, credible and trustworthy contribution to policymaking
processes, has become politically charged (cf. Hoppe, 1999, 2010;
Jasanoff, 1990; Lövbrand, 2011; Weingart, 1999).
In this paper we explore the issue of epistemic injustice in policy-
making practices. The term ‘epistemic injustice’, introduced by Miranda
Fricker in her book “Epistemic Injustice: Power and Ethics of Knowing”,
refers to ‘a wrong done’ to a person or group of people ‘specifically in
their capacity as a knower’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). The idea of epistemic
injustice (introduced in more detail below) raises questions such as:
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whose knowledge is recognized as credible information in policy-
making? Can we do someone (or a group of people) an injustice by not
recognizing their testimonies as credible contributions in policy-
making? And can the concept of ‘epistemic injustice’ help us in inter-
preting why, while policies are increasingly evidence-based, these de-
cisions become ever more contested?
While the concept of epistemic injustice has been widely applied in
various academic fields for analyzing interpersonal relationships, few
scholars have explored what the application of epistemic injustice to
the public arena would look like (Dieleman, 2015). And yet, the issue of
epistemic injustice seems particularly relevant in the context of public
policymaking. Someone who is not recognized as a credible source of
knowledge in policymaking lacks the social power to influence public
policy. Those who lack the power to influence policy processes, are
potentially deprived of a fair share of collective (financial, medical,
social, political) resources and are possibly excluded from practices of
deliberating and constructing collective futures.
In this paper we analyze policy practices from the perspective of
epistemic injustice. Next, we will, first, explore the concept of epistemic
injustice in more detail and elaborate on the role of evidence in pol-
icymaking practices. We, then, turn to two earlier published case-stu-
dies of knowledge-intensive, evidence-based policy practices in Dutch
health insurance (Moes et al., 2017, 2018) and study how diverse
groups of knowers participate as epistemic agents in these public de-
cision-making processes. It is important to note that, while epistemic
injustice is a normative concept, this is not a normative analysis. Ra-
ther, it is an empirical study of how different forms of knowledge are
used in policymaking. On the basis of this empirical analysis, we discuss
the usefulness as well as the limits of the concept epistemic injustice in
analyzing knowledge-intensive policymaking practices and explore
whether the concept of epistemic injustice can help us to interpret why
policy decisions become contested.
1.1. The concept of epistemic injustice
The concept of epistemic (in)justice refers to the question of whe-
ther parties are duly recognized ‘in their capacity as knower’ and have a
fair share of our ‘collective interpretative resources’ at hand in order to
manifest what they know (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). Fricker identifies two
types of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007). The first is ‘testimonial
injustice’, which occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a ‘de-
flated level of credibility’ to a speaker's words (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). As
an example of testimonial injustice, drawing from Harper Lee's book
“To Kill a Mockingbird”, Fricker cites jurors' failure to believe the tes-
timony of Tom Robinson – a black man in Maycomb County, Alabama,
USA in 1935 – because they are prejudiced against black people
(Fricker, 2007, p. 23). When someone lacks credibility, ‘their assertions
are not accepted by those to whom they are directed, and they are
treated as lacking what is required to be a reliable informant’
(Hookway, 2010, p. 152). This is considered a form of injustice, because
this person is then unable to perform certain social and political tasks
that demand credibility. According to Fricker, someone's status as
epistemic agent affects his/her ‘social power’, which she defines as the
‘capacity we have as social agents to influence how things go in the
social world’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 9).
A second form of epistemic injustice that inhibits social power is
‘hermeneutical’, referring to ‘a gap in collective interpretive resources
[that] puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making
sense of their social experiences’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). While in ‘testi-
monial’ injustice someone is wronged in their capacity as ‘a giver of
knowledge’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) and suffers a ‘credibility deficit’
(Coady, 2010, p. 110), in ‘hermeneutical’ injustice someone is wronged
in their capacity as ‘a subject of social understanding’ (Fricker, 2007, p.
7) and suffers an ‘intelligibility deficit’ (Coady, 2010, p. 110). As an
example, Fricker mentions Susan Brownmiller's book “In Our Time:
Memoir of a Revolution” in which she recounts the situation of Carmita
Wood, ‘a women who suffers sexual harassment prior to the time when
we had this critical concept, so she cannot properly comprehend her
own experience, let alone render it communicatively intelligible to
others’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). This is considered a form of injustice,
because someone who cannot make him/herself understood is unable to
perform social and political tasks that demand their intelligible con-
tribution. Someone who suffers a lack of conceptual resources to make
him/herself understood, is unable to effectively participate in ‘practices
through which social meanings are generated’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 6).
Instead of focusing on the question of how to achieve justice, Fricker
proposes a conceptual framework to study how injustices occur in
practices of knowing. As such, her work allows for the detection and
correction of injustices and for the piecemeal engineering towards
justice. According to Fricker we can (and should) fight epistemic in-
justice by cultivating the virtues of testimonial and hermeneutic justice.
This is done by tracing instances of epistemic injustice and guarding
against prejudice in assessing and processing the testimonies of others
(Fricker, 2007).
Critics have argued that the ‘virtue’ of epistemic justice cannot
reasonably be required (Alcoff, 2010; Langton, 2010; Sherman, 2016).
As one critic put it:
‘in the contemporary world, we are all constantly bombarded with
testimony, from a variety of sources … We have limited evidence
about many of these sources … Given the pressure of time, and the
barrage of testimony, it is nearly impossible for us to make cred-
ibility judgments that match the evidence in all such cases. That is
more than can be reasonably expected of us’ (Maitra, 2010, p. 199).
According to these authors, Fricker's account lacks an explanation of
who is responsible (in our private, professional, public or political
lives?) – and when (in what situation?) – for taking on the role of the
virtuous listener (Dieleman, 2015; Maitra, 2010).
Against the background of debates about epistemic injustice, this
paper explores the relevance of the concept in the context of public
decision-making. Fricker's work makes us aware that stakeholders'
ability to participate meaningfully in public deliberation is dependent
on their credibility and intelligibility (Fricker, 2007). While policy-
makers have been experimenting with deliberative spaces to engage
citizens more directly in setting the direction for policy decisions
(Dieleman, 2015), at the same time, concerns have been raised about
the ‘epistemological status’ that is actually accredited to public
knowledge (Irwin, 2006, p. 315). In the context of healthcare policy, it
has been argued that patients do not always have the epistemic re-
sources to ‘effectively make use of’ the possibilities offered to partici-
pate in formal decision-making procedures, and that procedures are not
always designed to enable ‘more than symbolic participation’ (Peeters
et al., 2014, p. 60). In this paper, we use Fricker's concept of epistemic
injustice as a heuristic method to study how diverse groups of knowers
participate as epistemic agents in the public arena, and explore the
usefulness and limits of Fricker's work in the context of public decision-
making.
1.2. EBM in policymaking practices
Applying the idea of epistemic injustice to healthcare, Carel and
Kidd suggested that ‘the structures of contemporary healthcare practice
encourage epistemic injustice because they privilege certain styles of
articulating testimonies, certain forms of evidence, and certain ways of
presenting and sharing knowledge’ (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 530). One
of the contemporary ‘structures’ in healthcare (both in clinical practice
and in policy practices) is Evidence-based Medicine (EBM), an epis-
temic ideal for decision-making in health care. EBM entails ‘the con-
scientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence’ in
medical decision-making (Sackett et al., 1996). It was announced in
1992 as a ‘new paradigm’ for medicine (Evidence-Based Medicine
Working Group, 1992, p. 2420), emphasizing the use of
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epidemiological, quantitative, experimental evidence in medical deci-
sion-making (e.g. Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) and systematic
reviews). Originally designed for clinical practice, the principles behind
EBM have become an epistemic ideal for making policy decisions too:
policy should be based on (experimental) evidence of ‘what works’.
While the founding fathers of EBM claim that EBM entails the in-
tegration of the best epidemiological evidence with clinical expertise
and patients' preferences (Sackett et al., 1996), critics are concerned
that EBM and its focus on quantitative population-based research un-
intentionally undervalues both doctors and patients ‘as "knowers" cap-
able of making judgements outside the confines of epidemiological
evidence’ (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018; Ghinea et al., 2015, p. 28;
Greenhalgh, 2002; Greenhalgh et al., 2015). A perennial question, thus,
remains: does the epistemic ideal that underpins EBM sufficiently ac-
commodate the different kinds of (local and contextual) knowledge that
are also required in clinical decisions (Greenhalgh, 2002) and in public
decision-making (Dobrow et al., 2004; Greenhalgh and Russell, 2009).
This paper engages with the latter issue: how is knowledge-intensive
and evidence-based policymaking intertwined with questions of epis-
temic injustice?
2. Method
This paper draws from ethnographic research conducted at the
National Health Care Institute (Zorginstituut Nederland), a public
knowledge institution that plays a central role in the Dutch health in-
surance system and is responsible for making priority-setting decisions
in the context of the basic benefits package and plays a key role
managing the quality of care.
We studied ‘how knowing is done’ (de Laet, 2012, p. 429) at the
National Health Care Institute, its ‘epistemic culture’ (Knorr Cetina,
2007). In particular, we looked at the Institute's practice of creating and
warranting knowledge as a basis to justify policy decisions. Due to the
public nature of the Institute, its knowledge work centers on the justi-
fication of decisions. We studied what types of knowledge (e.g. ex-
perimental evidence, expertise, experience of doctors and patients) the
National Health Care Institute employs in its efforts to attain im-
partiality, objectivity and justice in policy decisions.
From October 2013 to September 2017, the Institute's management
provided the first author with an in-house desk, a digital workplace and
access to archives to do intensive fieldwork within the Institute. The
first author attended public and closed meetings of internal working
groups, the executive board, as well as expert meetings of the Institute's
advising committees, staff fora and informal lunches.
Taking a case-study approach, we selected several real-life struggles
of the Institute in their knowledge-intensive decision-making processes
and our research focused progressively on these case-studies. Two of
the case-studies concerned “struggles” in which specific types of
knowledge or evidence supporting policy decisions were publicly con-
tested as parties felt that their knowledge was not sufficiently re-
cognized, their voices unheard or that they had not been taken seriously
in the policymaking process. We selected these two cases to analyze the
issue of epistemic injustice in policymaking processes.
Each case was researched in the same consecutive stages: 1) fa-
miliarization with the case through informal conversations with staff
and preliminary observations in meetings and fora; 2) supplementary
data-gathering through document analysis (emails, minutes, internal
and official documents, media articles) and selective overt non-parti-
cipant observation of relevant meetings; and 3) in-depth research and
triangulation through interviews with information-rich informants
whom we selected through ‘purposive’ sampling (Green and
Thorogood, 2004).
The leading question in analyzing the two case-studies from the
perspective of epistemic injustice was: were parties recognized ‘in their
capacity as knower’ and did they have a share of our ‘collective inter-
pretative resources’ at hand in order to participate meaningfully in
these knowledge-intensive decision-making processes? In this empirical
analysis, we abstain from making any normative claims about the
credibility or significance of particular epistemic agents. As is cus-
tomary in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) we remain
impartial ‘with respect to truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality,
success or failure’ of any particular form of knowledge (Bloor, 1976, p.
7). The abstention from taking such a standpoint (in STS this is called
the ‘symmetry’ principle) allows us to conduct a systematic analysis
into the way others – such as e.g. policymakers –ascribe credibility and
significance to different types of knowers.
No additional data were gathered for the current paper, as we used
available research archives from two earlier published cases (Moes
et al., 2017, 2018). We do present previously unpublished material
from the existing data set. As a ‘member-check’, we sent a written
version of the analysis to staff-members and directors involved, to test
our analysis with them.
3. Questions regarding epistemic injustice in reimbursement
decisions
In the Netherlands, private health insurance companies provide
standard basic health insurance for all citizens. The 2006 Health
Insurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet, Zvw) obliges everybody who resides
– or pays payroll tax – in the Netherlands to take out basic healthcare
insurance from a private insurance company. Income-related subsidies
make basic healthcare insurance affordable for all citizens. Insurers are
obliged to accept enrollees regardless of their age or health condition; a
risk adjustment scheme compensates them for clients with predictably
high medical expenses (Van de Ven and Schut, 2009). Competition was
introduced on two levels. First, citizens can choose between competing
health insurance companies during a yearly open enrollment period.
Second, private insurance companies are expected to negotiate the
prices, services, and quality of care on behalf of their insured clients
(Van de Ven and Schut, 2008, p. 779).
The National Health Care Institute is tasked with managing the
basic benefits package. The Minister of Health formally requests advice
from the Institute on the medical–technical content of care that can be
reimbursed from the basic health insurance. The Institute subjects
major new drugs to cost-effectiveness analysis before coverage is con-
sidered (Staal et al., 2015). Such evaluations avoid the automatic in-
clusion of new drugs for intramural patients in the benefits package
(Helderman et al., 2014, pp. 23–25). The Institute provides author-
itative standpoints on existing medical treatments and non-pharma-
ceutical interventions when healthcare professionals lack clarity about
the reimbursement of these treatments. The first case-study is about one
of these reimbursement decisions (Moes et al., 2017).
3.1. The case
In 2013, the National Health Care Institute issued a reimbursement
standpoint that bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hya-
luronic acid should no longer be covered by the basic health insurance,
as there was no quantified proof of the treatment's effectiveness.
Bladder instillations are a medical treatment used for various bladder
conditions, including bladder cancer, interstitial cystitis and painful
bladder syndrome. During treatment a fine tube (catheter) is inserted
into the bladder, the bladder is then filled with a solution (including a
pharmacological cocktail of e.g. chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic
acid) and after a period of time the bladder is drained.
To arrive at a positive reimbursement decision, the Institute re-
quires conclusive proof of a treatment's effectiveness (College voor
Zorgverzekeringen, 2007). The Institute uses the principles of EBM to
gauge effectiveness, meaning that systematic reviews and double-
blinded randomized-controlled trials (RCTs) are deemed to provide
more objective information about treatment effectiveness than com-
parative or non-comparative research or expert opinions (College voor
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Zorgverzekeringen, 2007, pp. 8–9). Two double-blind RCTs showed
improvements after treatment with bladder instillations with chon-
droitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid, but the difference with the placebo
group was not statistically significant (College voor Zorgverzekeringen,
2013, p. 11). The Institute therefore concluded that bladder instillations
did not fulfil the reimbursement criteria as there was no quantitative
proof of its effectiveness.
The Patients' Association for Interstitial Cystitis (ICP) sued the
National Health Care Institute for misconduct against interstitial cystitis
patients. Interstitial Cystitis (IC) refers to a spectrum of urological
symptoms characterized by (chronic) pelvic, bladder and urethral pain,
persistent urge to void or increased urinary frequency, as well as irri-
tative voiding symptoms (Shao et al., 2010). Some IC-patients claim to
benefit from bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or hya-
luronic acid. Also, urologists who frequently use these bladder in-
stillations claim that their experience with this treatment is often po-
sitive. Urologists' professional organization, the Dutch Urological
Association (NVU), agreed with the Institute that ‘at the moment there
is insufficient reliable research’ that provided quantitative evidence of
this treatment's positive effect, but stressed that the two RCTs did ‘NOT
prove that the washes are NOT effective’ (College voor
Zorgverzekeringen, 2013, p. 21 emphasis in original).
The ICP's lawyer stated before the court: ‘I do not contradict that the
efficacy of a treatment is a prerequisite for being eligible for inclusion
in the insured benefits package’ (hearing#30042014). In making sense
of this treatment's effectiveness, however, the lawyer argued that the
EBM-method attributed too little credibility to the experience of doctors
and patients: ‘what everyday practice thinks about something has too
little evidential value in the EBM-method’ (hearing#30042014). Next,
we examine the issue of testimonial injustice: were patients and urol-
ogists, indeed, insufficiently recognized in their capacity as knower?
3.2. Testimonial (in)justice
The ICP's lawyer introduced several patient testimonies about the
experienced effect of bladder instillations with chondroitin sulphate or
hyaluronic acid. A patient stated, for example, as follows:
‘After a very tumultuous period lasting some months, my bladder
has settled down as a result of the bladder instillations with hya-
luronic acid. Because of the bladder instillations, my bladder hasn't
suffered a ‘flare-up’ in almost a year’ (exhibit 17 #1)
While the Institute did not deny that individual IC patients might
benefit from treatment with bladder instillations, they did not take
patient testimonials into account. According to the principles of EBM,
personal accounts do not suffice to establish a treatment's effectiveness
and whether it “works” for the average patient, especially in the case of
IC. A staff member explained: ‘Some of the patients have a functional
syndrome … and these are subjective outcome measures that you ex-
amine, i.e., improvement or reduction in symptoms. We were therefore
explicit in saying ‘we want randomized studies and not case series’’
(notes#03032014). In addition, the symptoms of IC fluctuate over time,
which makes it even more difficult to attribute changes in symptoms to
specific interventions. The Institute therefore decided:
‘As interstitial cystitis is a disorder that is characterized by a fluc-
tuating course and there is no standard treatment, randomized
studies are needed in which bladder instillation with washes con-
taining chondroitin sulphate and/or hyaluronic acid is compared
with placebo washes. As the symptoms and outcome parameters are
subjective, double-blind studies are preferred’ (College voor
Zorgverzekeringen, 2013, p. 10).
Double-blind and placebo-controlled RCTs keep both patient and
doctor in the dark about the treatment received. This is considered
important in case of subjective symptoms like pain. According to the
principles of EBM, this type of experimental design curtails the
possibility of biased cognition and is deemed the most reliable and
‘objective’ measurement of a treatment's effect. The Institute, following
the EBM-method, attributed reduced credibility to the individual tes-
timonies of patients and urologists due to considerations of potential
cognitive bias. From the perspective of epistemic injustice, one could
say that the EBM-method in this case regards both patients and doctors
as – to some extent – ‘lacking the ability to make reliable assertions’
(Hookway, 2010, p. 152). Not deliberately, but we can at least conclude
that patients and urologists were ‘marginalized’ as credible epistemic
agents with the EBM-method (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 530).
The Institute explained that ‘the fact that individual patients claim
to benefit from the treatment is not sufficient to conclude that the
treatment complies with [reimbursement criteria]’, and that the
Institute ‘does not issue statements about and on behalf of individual
patients’ (email#16122013). Rather, the Institute must consider the
limited public funds available and ensure that citizens, who pay the
premiums, are paying for something that is worthwhile –involving not
an individual person, but the public at large. According to one of the
directors, using EBM's quantitative methods allowed the Institute to
make such calculations.
‘the use of non-personal statistical data on a group level makes it
possible to weigh up the personal interests of one group of patients
against those of another group of patients. Every euro that you
spend on bladder instillation liquids is no longer available for
spending on care for elderly persons suffering from dementia, to
name just one … ’ (notes#25062015)
While the Institute may have recognized patients and doctors ‘as
possessors and transmitters of knowledge’, they did not recognize in-
dividual patients' and doctors' testimonies as a format of information
that was ‘useful in the current context’ of making public reimbursement
decisions (Hookway, 2010, p. 158).
Is this a form of testimonial injustice? According to Hookway,
meaningful epistemic participation requires ‘that we be charitable in
our understandings, willing to explore the possible uses of the con-
tributions that have been made’ (Hookway, 2010, p. 161). Epistemic
injustice lurks when the ‘hermeneutical offerings’ of a patient (or a
doctor) is not judged as ‘epistemically authoritative’ in itself or even
treated as an ‘epistemically distinctive form of knowledge’ (Carel and
Kidd, 2014, p. 533). But what can reasonably be expected of policy-
makers? It would be impossible to recognize all individual testimonies
in a public decision-making context. Effective ways to include patients'
knowledge in public decision-making are still being developed and re-
searched (e.g. Lavis et al., 2009), also by the Institute (Kalf et al., 2018;
Makady et al., 2017).
The EBM-method seems to provide the Institute with a much-needed
‘logic of knowledge consumption’ (Knorr Cetina, 2007, p. 368) that
allows the Institute to make aggregate decisions on population level,
that are justifiable as impartial and ‘objective’ in the public arena. The
more pressing question in this case is whether patients (as a group of
knowers) had enough epistemic resources to make themselves ‘in-
telligible’ within this EBM-formatted public space. Next, we explore the
question of hermeneutical injustice: did patients have a fair share of our
‘collective interpretative resources’ at their disposal to manifest their
experiences within the EBM-method (Fricker, 2007, p. 1)?
3.3. Hermeneutical (in)justice
The EBM-method used by the Institute provided two opportunities
for IC-patients to make their experiences intelligible in the decision-
making process: 1) new positive quantitative research 2) new positive
quantitative subgroup research. First, the Institute stressed that ‘if new
positive studies are published, [the Institute] can revise their stand-
point’ (email#16122013). This meant that a positive reimbursement
decision was possible if patients could present studies that captured
their positive experiences with this treatment in a study with the
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methodological design of an RCT. Second, the Institute insisted
throughout the lawsuit that ‘when [subpopulation] research becomes
available, a new assessment could take place that may result in a dif-
ferent opinion’ (statement of defense). The Institute would consider
reimbursement for specific groups of IC-patients with proven benefit
from this treatment provided that new subgroup studies were published
that showed such a positive effect. The Institute recognized that ‘based
on the literature […], there is a vague idea that a subgroup exists’
(email#14012014). (Literature suggests, for example, that this treat-
ment works especially for patients with Hunner's lesions in the
bladder.) This meant that a positive reimbursement decision was pos-
sible if IC-patients could make their experiences intelligible in new
quantitative subgroup research (RCT). During legal proceedings, the
ICP presented several scientific articles and conference abstracts of
promising studies. None of these studies, however, had the experi-
mental design of an RCT. Furthermore, no subgroup studies were
available. Hence, the Institute did not change its standpoint.
In her final verdict, the judge considered that patients were not
wronged in the Institute's decision-making process. She argued that the
Institute had correctly followed the EBM-procedure and had also given
patients the opportunity to provide new evidence that the Institute may
have missed. The final verdict read: ‘it has been established that the
information that the ICP could have supplied – and which was supplied
during these proceedings – did not lead to a different assessment’
(ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2014:772, emphasis added). With that verdict the
court upheld the Institute's standpoint not to reimburse bladder in-
stillations with chondroitin sulphate or hyaluronic acid.
According to the patients (ICP) and urologists (NVU), however,
translating the positive experiences of clinicians and patients with this
treatment into the type of experimental evidence required for re-
imbursement was not possible. Urologists explained in a letter to the
Institute that IC is a spectrum of urological symptoms with different
(often unknown) underlying causes and its sufferers are likely to re-
spond differently to treatment:
‘In practice of state-of-the-art clinics that treat patients with IC, this
means it is not possible to produce such hard scientific evidence to
show which treatments work and which do not. Large series are
impossible due to the diversity of the groups of patients and the way
in which IC presents, which means that hard evidence will never be
supplied’ (letter from the urologists' association NVU).
From the perspective of epistemic injustice: do patients who can
only participate in decision-making if their contribution comes in the
shape of quantitative, statistical (subgroup) evidence truly get a chance
to epistemically participate? According to urologists, the required type
of quantitative evidence could not be produced. The above statement
shows that urologists considered the opportunity to provide new posi-
tive RCT studies methodologically infeasible. Moreover, one of the
Institute's scientific advisory members remarked about the feasibility of
subgroup research: ‘who would want to carry out an RCT involving
something that doesn't work?’ (notes#30302014). Whether the re-
search community would ever conduct further subgroup research is
questionable. IC does not easily attract research attention or funds (in
contrast to, for example, breast cancer or HIV/Aids). This means that
IC-patients are often left to the mercy of a few dedicated experts (Shao
et al., 2010). This is a group of patients with minimal investigative
resources at their disposal to make sense of their experiences. Though
the requirement of subgroup analysis may seem hypothetically rigorous
from an EBM-perspective, in practice, it is unrealistic.
This means that IC-patients had (and still have) meager research
resources to make themselves intelligible within the EBM-method. This
is more than a case of ‘circumstantial epistemic bad luck’ (Fricker,
2007, p. 152). Most clinical research has ‘minimal patient input’, which
often means that studies reflect outcomes that matter to researchers,
rather than those that matter to patients (Greenhalgh et al., 2015, p. 2;
Wiering et al., 2017). Consequently, patients participate only
marginally ‘in the collective practice of interpretation and under-
standing of their medical situation’ (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 532) and
they have few entry points or resources to generate the required re-
search. It was with this considerable ‘hermeneutical disadvantage’
(Fricker, 2007, pp. 151–152) that IC-patients participated in the EBM-
formatted decision-making process.
4. Questions regarding epistemic injustice in performance
measurement
Since the introduction of the 2006 Health Insurance Act, private
insurance companies play a prominent role in the Dutch healthcare
system of managed competition. Insurers and hospitals are free to ne-
gotiate prices and selectively contract a range of hospital care products
(Van de Ven and Schut, 2008). Insurers can steer their customers away
from hospitals that do not reduce their prices or improve quality. Se-
lective contracting is thought to stimulate both quality and efficiency
(Bijlsma et al., 2009).
For selective contracting, insurance companies need comparative
information about the performance of healthcare providers in order to
negotiate price and quality (Delnoij et al., 2010; Enthoven and Van de
Ven, 2007). As of April 1st, 2014, the National Health Care Institute is
lawfully tasked to provide understandable, comparable and trustworthy
information about the quality of care. As part of its official tasks, the
Institute promotes the development of quality measures (e.g. quality
standards, clinical guidelines, performance indicators, etc.) and stimu-
lates the implementation of quality metrics.
Our second case is about the Institute's mediation in a dispute be-
tween doctors, hospitals and insurers about the use of performance
indicators in decision-making on the centralization of emergency care
in the Netherlands (see Moes et al., 2018). This case offers the oppor-
tunity to analyze questions regarding epistemic injustice that arise in
performance measurement.
4.1. The case
In 2013, the Association of Dutch Health Insurers (Zorgverzekeraars
Nederland, hereafter ‘ZN’) published a set of outcome, process and
structure indicators to measure the quality of hospitals' care for multi-
trauma, acute myocardial infarction, cerebrovascular accident, (rup-
tured) abdominal aortic aneurysm, natal care and hip fracture. The
indicators were designed to enable ‘insurers to shape their selective care
purchasing’ (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland, 2013, p. 5). By the end of
2013, insurers had started to use ZN's indicators to compare hospitals in
the various regions and started negotiating which centers would (pre-
ferably) provide services for emergency cardiology, emergency neu-
rology, traumatology, urgent vascular surgical care, and obstetrics. The
idea was to centralize these services in specialized centers where in-
dicators suggested that this was desirable (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland,
2013).
Insurers' plans had far-reaching consequences for individual medical
centers and caused much debate amongst emergency care professionals.
When negotiations between insurers and hospitals started, a dis-
appointed hospital director stated: “Emergency room closed, no more
obstetrics, nor stroke care, no balloon angioplasty, and even broken hip
operations will have to be done elsewhere” (Visser, 2014a). Profes-
sional media reported: ‘In Rotterdam most complex emergency care will
move to Erasmus Medical Center. Soon four times as many people will
be going there with a stroke. Five hospitals will lose stroke care’ (Van
Aartsen, 2014b). Medical specialists feared a “cascading effect”: if a
hospital loses its contract for the treatment of, for example, myocardial
infarction, general cardiology in that hospital could deteriorate or even
vanish completely (Visser, 2014b). Professional media reported that
hospitals' positions in the debate about insurers' plans were determined
by interests: ‘hospitals that lose care tasks often object, while the
winners see only the advantages’ of insurers' plans (Kiers, 2014b).
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Doctors, hospitals and professional organizations working in the
field of Dutch emergency care contested, furthermore, the accuracy of
the indicators and the appropriateness of insurers' use of them. Field
parties were concerned about insurers' lack of medical-technical and
practical knowledge about emergency care (Kiers, 2014b; Van Aartsen,
2014a). The Dutch Hospitals' Association (NVZ) felt that insurers' plans
were ‘not properly substantiated’ and claimed that such indicators
‘must be based on scientific research and have the support of medical
specialists’ (Kiers, 2014b). Apart from battling about resources, this was
a knowledge dispute. It was a fight about whose job it was to determine
the parameters for performance.
Next, we analyze the indicator-debate from the perspective of
epistemic injustice. In the formulation and interpretation of the quality
indicators for emergency care: were different stakeholders duly re-
cognized in their capacity as knowers of emergency care? And did the
different stakeholders have the hermeneutical resources to participate
meaningfully in the process of drawing up (and putting to use) these
indicators?
4.2. Hermeneutical (in)justice
Although representatives of the Dutch professional associations
were not directly involved in formulating ZN's quality indicators, ZN
did consult medical professionals' knowledge about good quality
emergency care as represented in professional and academic literature.
ZN based its indicators on a vast number of scientific publications, in-
cluding RCTs, systematic reviews and cohort studies, as well as Dutch,
European and international guidelines (Zorgverzekeraars Nederland,
2013). As such, medical professionals' ‘hermeneutical offerings’ were
actually judged as ‘epistemically authoritative’ in the formulation of
ZN's performance indicators (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 533). Medical
professionals, as a group of knowers, were part of the collective practice
of interpreting and understanding the quality of emergency care and
determining parameters for performance. No hermeneutical injustice
occurred, as it was not ‘a gap in collective interpretive resources’ that
put medical specialists, hospitals and other professional organizations
at an ‘unfair disadvantage’ in making sense of the quality of Dutch
emergency services (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). Any potential epistemic in-
justice lay elsewhere.
4.3. Testimonial (in)justice
Most parties considered the insurers' initiative a top-down exercise.
In professional media, the spokesperson for hospitals in the Northern
region claimed, that
‘no advance consultation took place with hospitals, the platform for
acute care, GPs and patients’ organizations. We were confronted
with a fait accompli. Lists with green and red ticks. And would we
formalize the plans within two weeks. You can't simply impose a
new model from your ivory tower’ (Kiers, 2014a).
While insurers regarded the negotiations as a collaborative process –
‘discussions are going well, people are involved’ – some hospitals felt
that insurers' plans had been ‘set in stone’ and that insurers were ‘not
interested in the vision of the NVZ or any alternative plans the hospitals
might have’ (Visser, 2014a). Hospitals felt that their knowledge about
the quality of emergency services had not been heard or taken seriously
by insurers.
According to Hookway, epistemically meaningful participation ‘is
not just a matter of exchanging information; it involves asking ques-
tions, floating ideas, considering alternative possibilities and so on’
(Hookway, 2010, p. 156). The arguments exchanged in professional
media as presented above show that both the professional community
and local healthcare providers felt that they did not truly participate in
deliberations.
Quality indicators, such as the ones used by ZN, follow the logic that
clinical science can determine ‘what works’ and parameters based on
these scientific findings can form an impartial and objective standard
for provider behavior. Academic work has shown that quantified clin-
ical knowledge is ‘easily transformed’ into a type of ‘business knowl-
edge of pathways and protocols’ such as performance indicators
(Mykhalovskiy and Weir, 2004, p. 1061). For non-medical parties who
have no access to the primary care processes – such as, in this case,
insurers – this aggregate knowledge provides the easiest way to gain
insights into “what works” in clinical practice. The use of such quan-
tified parameters is typically presumed to hold to ideals of impartiality,
objectivity and justice in measuring and comparing the quality of dif-
ferent healthcare services.
However, the use of such standardized protocols has also been
shown to challenge the clinical autonomy and professional judgement
of local healthcare providers (Greenhalgh, 2002; Knaapen, 2014;
Lambert, 2006; Timmermans and Berg, 2003; Timmermans and Kolker,
2004). Performance measures, in other words, undermine the ‘medical
professional's privileged authority to evaluate [his/her] own work’
(Knaapen, 2014, p. 829). It is ‘testimonial justice’ that is at stake when
the testimonies of local professionals threaten to be pushed aside by the
facts and figures of external parties who attribute more credibility to
parameters formulated by the medical profession at large than to the
embodied, contextual knowledge of local providers. Next, we study the
mediation work of the National Health Care Institute and show how
their work reinstalled local stakeholders as epistemic agents in the
deliberations.
The Institute became involved in the debate based on its role as
authoritative public knowledge institution working on providing reli-
able information about the quality of care. After several rounds of
consultations with professional organizations, the Institute pro-
blematized two things. First, the scope of the indicator set. Field parties
considered the scope of ZN's indicators too narrow and wanted to
broaden it to the full spectrum of medical emergencies (not restricted to
only six indications). They also considered it important to take into
account the patients' trajectory from emergency call to aftercare (not
just care that patients received in the ER). Therefore the Institute fa-
cilitated the development of a comprehensive ‘Emergency Care Chain
Quality Framework’ (encompassing the full spectrum of emergency
services and the entire patient trajectory) designed by all parties in-
volved: professional organizations of patients, general practitioners,
ambulance staff, primary healthcare, hospitals, academic medical cen-
ters, medical specialists, emergency doctors and health insurers. As
such, the Institute explicitly reinstated all the different stakeholders as
relevant epistemic agents in deliberating and making sense of the
quality and efficiency of Dutch emergency services and how they
should be organized.
Second, the Institute installed a group of thirteen experts re-
presentative of the professional emergency care community to provide
a formal assessment of the original set of performance indicators. While
the committee found that there was sufficient evidence supporting most
of the performance indicators and that they were ‘not unreasonable’,
they also stressed that the standardized knowledge of indicators alone
was not enough to make sense of the quality of emergency services. A
committee member explained that the quality of treatment for a heart
attack, for example,
‘ … starts with a patient raising the alarm in good time, after which
the GP takes a look, who then refers the patient to hospital in good
time, and all of that finally determines the outcome of a myocardial
infarction. If you judge a hospital based on, for instance, survival
rates for myocardial infarction, well then you would also have to
take into account the part of the chain before the hospital … If
people call in the GP too late, or the GP doesn't do his job properly,
you will be running the risk that indicators will work against hos-
pitals. You have to realize this, if you are going to make use of this
sort of indicator … ’
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While ZN's outcome indicators made sense in themselves, the
quality of treatment for a heart attack depends on the entire trajectory
from incident to aftercare. The committee stressed that the indicators
did not suffice to make sense of the performance of individual hospitals.
With ‘evidence-based medicine as the foundation of the quality move-
ment’, the committee's chairperson explained, the focus had moved to
‘standardized protocol quality’. But in applying such standards ‘local
data are important’ and collaboration in the region is necessary to ex-
ploit sources of local, tacit and contextual knowledge. As such, the
chairperson problematized insurers' use of standardized knowledge:
‘This was just one party … and a party that was at a considerable
distance … and because [the insurers] are at such distance, their
only weapon is population data from the evidence-based medicine
world … which is standardized … If someone has no hands-on ex-
perience and has never actually been to an emergency room … then
these are the only available data for him to use. But, then he forgets
the knowledge sources that are somewhat harder for him to exploit,
but that are very important too … ’
Ultimately, the committee emphasized that the performance in-
dicators were to be used by professionals to jointly discuss how best to
organize emergency services in the particular regions (Zorginstituut
Nederland, 2015, p. 15). The expert committee, by stressing the im-
portance of contextualizing the standardized performance measures
with local knowledge, reinstalled local emergency care professionals as
relevant epistemic agents in the process of making sense of the quality
of regional emergency care services and putting the quality indicators
to use.
The fact that this type “repair work” had to be taken up by the
Institute is a reminder that testimonial injustice lurks when non-med-
ical parties – who have no access to primary care processes – resort to
the use of quantified clinical parameters. The quantitative approach of
performance indicators suggests the possibility of separating ‘expertise
from expert, and knowledge from knower’ (Tanenbaum, 1995, p. 102).
This has given actors without direct experience of the primary care
process the opportunity to ‘regulate the field of healthcare and hold it
accountable using […] parameters formulated by the professions’
(Timmermans and Berg, 2003, p. 20). Quantified parameters are typi-
cally presumed to warrant impartiality, objectivity and justice in
measuring and comparing the quality of health services. Chances are,
however, that when high levels of credibility are attached to such
quantified parameters, the credibility of embodied and non-standar-
dized knowledge of local health professionals is unduly marginalized.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we studied the usefulness and limits of Fricker's con-
cept of epistemic injustice in the context of public decision-making. In
contemporary healthcare policies the logic of EBM is central to how
‘knowing is done’ (de Laet, 2012). Evidence-based decision-making is
typically proposed as a way of addressing a growing demand to ex-
plicitly justify decisions in the public arena (Dobrow et al., 2004;
Parkhurst, 2017). Policymakers' use of scientific knowledge – ‘evidence’
in particular – is presumed to pertain to ideals of impartiality, objec-
tivity and justice in decision-making and to guard policymakers against
the suspicion of arbitrariness or bias (Porter, 1994). However, ac-
cording to some, EBM ‘privileges’ certain types of evidence, certain
ways of presenting knowledge and certain styles of articulating testi-
monies, and is, therefore, ‘liable to generate epistemic injustice’ (Carel
and Kidd, 2014, pp. 530–531). In this paper we analyzed two cases of
EBM-inspired policy practices in Dutch social health insurance and
studied how knowledge work in policymaking is intertwined with
questions regarding epistemic justice.
Our analysis of the first case illustrated that the embodied knowl-
edge of patients and urologists was (unintentionally) marginalized as
credible and useful information in the Institute's EBM-based
reimbursement decision. In particular, patient testimonies are still seen
as subjective, ‘anecdotal’, limited to the ‘private realm’, ‘context-de-
pendent’, ‘as numerous as patients’, and, therefore, difficult to use in
public decision-making settings (Carel and Kidd, 2014, p. 535). And
yet, can policymakers reasonably be expected to hear all patient testi-
monies in a public setting where different interests are at stake? EBM's
principles provide policymakers with a much needed ‘logic of knowl-
edge consumption’ (Knorr Cetina, 2007) to make aggregate decisions on
population level that are explicitly justifiable as ‘objective’, ‘impartial’
and ‘just’ in the public arena. These quantified procedures are actually
designed to facilitate the conscious exercise of counteracting bias and to
prevent discriminatory outcome in policymaking. But, while formal
institutions and their procedures for policymaking may be considered
just, impartial and objective, this does not ensure that epistemic in-
justice is not occurring. Our analysis showed that patients had meager
resources to produce the ‘hard evidence’ with which they could make
themselves intelligible within the EBM-formatted public decision-
making. If this type of hermeneutical marginalization is not recognized
in policymaking, decisions may be regarded as upholding ideals of
procedural fairness, but may still be epistemically unjust and poten-
tially lead ‘to misrepresentations in collective preferences’ (Bernal,
2018, p. 23) (Moes et al., 2017).
The second case illustrated that questions regarding meaningful
epistemic participation are equally relevant in making decisions in the
context of the healthcare market. Performance indicators follow the
same logic as EBM: clinical science can determine ‘what works’ and
parameters based on these quantified findings can form an objective
standard for provider behavior (Eddy, 2005; Tanenbaum, 2012). The
use of performance indicators based on quantified clinical knowledge
has given non-medical parties the possibility to act independently in a
field where – originally – they had no epistemic authority (see
Tanenbaum, 2012). The second case illustrated that when the proto-
colled and quantified medical knowledge of performance metrics aligns
to match the logic of the insurers' market, the embodied, contextual
knowledge of local professionals is potentially silenced. In that case it is
questionable whether indicators still serve to promote the quality of
care.
Both cases show the frustration that certain groups of knowers ex-
perience when they are not being recognized as credible epistemic
agents in policy practices. This ‘epistemic’ frustration may help to in-
terpret why policy decisions become contested in the public domain.
Application of the concept of epistemic injustice to policy practices
shows that when groups of knowers (whether patients or local profes-
sionals) are not duly recognized as epistemic agents, they subsequently
lack the social power to influence priority-setting practices in which
their interests are at stake. These groups are not merely frustrated in
their epistemic capacity to be heard and make themselves understood,
they are – as a result – potentially deprived of a fair share in our col-
lective financial and medical resources. If we fail to recognize in-
equalities in credibility and intelligibility between diverse groups of
knowers, there is a chance that these latent epistemic inequalities are
being reproduced in our system of health insurance and our ways of
distributing healthcare provisions.
It is important to stress that both international literature and the
National Health Care Institute have long moved beyond a naive faith in
the ability of EBM to straightforwardly guide complex priority-setting
decisions (Russell et al., 2011). Aware of the shortfalls of EBM's strict
hierarchy, the Institute now makes use of, for example, GRADE (see
Guyatt et al., 2008), an EBM-method that allows more flexibility within
the original hierarchy. The Institute is also exploring how to use ‘real-
world data’ (Makady et al., 2017) and patient experiences from social
media in health technology assessments (Kalf et al., 2018). This “repair
and maintenance work” shows that policymakers continue to search for
ways to meaningfully combine patients' and professionals' embodied,
qualitative knowledge with aggregate, quantitative knowledge in pol-
icymaking. Epistemic injustice, however, often precedes such repair
F. Moes, et al. Social Science & Medicine 245 (2020) 112674
7
work. It is, therefore, important that our priority-setting practices are
continuously evaluated from the perspective of epistemic injustice.
The concept of epistemic injustice, however, also misses some key
processes involved understanding how ‘knowing gets done’ in public
policy processes. This has much to do with the infrastructure on which
policymaking – in this case priority-setting – draws: current (interna-
tional) procedures, conventions, regulations, stakeholders, etc. Fricker
focusses on the role of the virtuous and unprejudiced listener, empha-
sizing the interrelational aspects of epistemic injustice. However, in the
context of public decision-making, epistemic injustice typically does not
originate between agents, but in the knowledge infrastructure from
which agents draw. It is often through the work of policymakers that
deeper, structural epistemic inequalities are made visible, and it is
important not to reproduce these inequalities in priority-setting. Where
were these injustices produced in the first place (Epstein, 2007)? Who is
actually responsible for the widespread lack of credibility attributed to
patient testimonies? In order to apply the concept of epistemic injustice
adequately in the public context, we need to explore much more
thoroughly the question of what ‘epistemic justice’ as a virtue requires
of social institutions (Anderson, 2012). What does epistemic responsi-
bility look like in a collective context (cf. Isaacs, 2011)? If we want to
further develop and use the concept of epistemic injustice to investigate
policy practices, these questions require our explicit attention.
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